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THE WRONGHEADED AND DANGEROUS CAMPAIGN TO CRIMINALIZE
GOOD FAITH LEGAL ADVICE
Julian Ku*
I argue in this brief essay that the increasingly fervent insistence on crimi-
nal punishment of the Bush administration lawyers for their legal advice on
interrogation policy is both wrong-headed and dangerous. It is wrong-
headed because the insistence on criminal prosecution of attorneys based
solely upon their good faith interpretation of the law is highly unlikely to
succeed as a matter of both U.S. and international law. It is dangerous be-
cause, at least with respect to US. law, prosecuting good faith legal advice
is (and should be) a violation of those attorneys' constitutional rights under
the US. Constitution's First Amendment and broader norms offree expres-
sion. Insisting on prosecuting lawyers for their good-faith legal advice, or
even threatening prosecution, will chill the ability of future government
lawyers to give legal advice on complex and important questions implicat-
ing U.S. national security.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is hardly unusual for a U.S. President or for a U.S. administration
to be charged with committing war crimes. President Franklin Roosevelt
was accused of violating the Neutrality Act in order to incite a war with
Germany.1 President Harry Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb in
Japan has been called a war crime so many times it is hardly worth docu-
menting.2 Presidents Johnson and Nixon were pilloried over their Vietnam
War and Cambodia military plans.3 More recently, critics have brought out
the "war crime" accusation against President Bush's military action in the
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I See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Hillman, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander in Chief, 29
CARDozo L. REv. 1037, 1043 (2008) (committing U.S. resources to help the British in World
War Two violated the official U.S. stance of neutrality).
2 See, e.g., Matthew Lippman, Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of
War: Technology and Terror from World War I to Afghanistan, 33 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 29
(2002) (holding in a Japanese court that deploying the atomic bomb was a violation of inter-
national humanitarian laws of war).
3 See, e.g., EDWARD R. DRACHMAN & ALAN SHANK, PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY
COUNTDOWN TO 10 CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS 123, 151-52 (1997) (describing the war pro-
testors and congressional backlash for both war strategies).
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Gulf War and Panama, 4 and President Clinton's bombings of Kosovo. 5 One
only has to review the list of charges drawn up by former U.S. Attorney
General Ramsey Clark over the years to get a flavor of these types of
charges. 6
The most recent wave of war crimes accusations against the George
W. Bush administration is different. But the difference lies mostly in the
near obsessive focus of the accusers on the legal advice of Bush Adminis-
tration lawyers.7 As the papers to this symposium demonstrate, it is likely
that a majority of international lawyers and scholars reject the legal interpre-
tations adopted by the Bush Administration in the pursuit of the war on ter-
rorisn, most especially the widely condemned "torture memos." 8 But many
have gone farther than simply arguing that the legal advice was wrong. A
number of scholars and advocates have argued for, indeed demanded, a
criminal prosecution of such lawyers for giving their legal advice. 9
I agree that the so-called "torture memos" drew a standard that was
too loose, and I believe (with the benefit of hindsight) that I would have
written an opinion more limiting of interrogation techniques than the one
that was written. But to me, my disagreement with the legal analysis of the
memos on interrogation policy is very different from stating that I believe
the lawyers who gave that advice should be held criminally liable solely for
their legal advice.
4 See, e.g., Francis Boyle, US War Crimes During the Gulf War, COUNTERPUNCH, Sept. 2,
2002, http://www.counterpunch.org/boyle09O2.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (claiming
President Bush was responsible for multiple counts of war crimes in Panama and during the
Persian Gulf War including genocide).
5 See, e.g., Hero or Villain? Bill Clinton Statue in Kosovo Angers Serbs, RUSSIA TODAY,
Oct. 9, 2009, http://russiatoday.com/TopNews/2009-10-09/bill-clinton-statue-kosovo.html/
print (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (quoting the brother of Radovan Karadzic that the bomb-
ings initiated by President Clinton and NATO forces may have been the worst since World
War II).
6 See Press Release, The Wisdom Fund, International Commission of Inquiry on Eco-
nomic Sanctions, Former US Attorney General Charges US, British and UN Leaders (Nov.
20, 1996), available at http:/www.twf.org/News/Y1997/Ramsey.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2009).
7 See, e.g., PHILLIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN VALUES (2008).
8 See, e.g., Previously Secret Torture Memo Released, CNN, July 24, 2008, http://
edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/24/cia.torture/?iref=-hpmostpop (last visited Nov. 16,
2009) (providing links to the "torture memos"). See also 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 615
(2006) (print version of the "torture memos").
9 See, e.g., Milan Milanovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEo. J. LEGAL ETICS
347, 349 (2007); Joseph Lavitt, The Crime of Conviction of John Choon Yoo: The Actuality
of Criminality of OLC During the Bush Administration, 62 MAINE L. REv. (forthcoming
2009), available at httpJ/papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=1474940 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2009).
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Indeed, in this short essay, I will argue that this increasingly fervent
insistence on criminal punishment of the Bush lawyers for their legal advice
is both wrong-headed and dangerous. It is wrong-headed because the insis-
tence on criminal prosecution of attorneys based solely upon their good
faith interpretation of the law is highly unlikely to succeed as a matter of
both U.S. and international law. It is dangerous because, at least with re-
spect to U.S. law, prosecuting good faith legal advice is (and should be)
violations of those attorneys' constitutional rights under the U.S. Constitu-
tion's First Amendment and broader norms of free expression. Insisting on
prosecuting lawyers for their good-faith legal advice, even threatening pros-
ecution, will chill the ability of future government lawyers to give legal
advice on complex and important questions implicating U.S. national
security.
II. THE EXTREMELY WEAK CASE FOR PROSECUTING THE BUSH LAWYERS
It is not surprising that legal academics are generally critical of at-
tempts to prosecute attorneys, especially for giving legal advice. In contexts
other than U.S. government interrogation policies, scholars have generally
criticized overzealous prosecutions of criminal defense lawyers and securi-
ties lawyers on the grounds that such prosecutions chill the ability to give
legal advice and legal advocacy more generally. 10
What is surprising is the willingness of many scholars to entertain,
or advocate for, criminal prosecution of the Bush lawyers. Legal scholars
have relentlessly criticized the "torture memos," not to mention the legal
advice undergirding the Bush Administration's policies on the war on ter-
rorism more generally. But the attention on the legal advice is almost un-
precedented.
There is only one plausible theory by which the Bush attorneys may
be criminally liable for their legal advice: aiding and abetting the act of tor-
ture as defined under U.S. law and under international law."1 There is no
evidence that the Bush lawyers in any way participated in the alleged inter-
rogations, so there can be no question of actually punishing them directly
under the statute or international treaties prohibiting torture.
There are two relevant sets of laws that might be invoked to prose-
cute the Bush lawyers. First, under U.S. law, torture is a federal crime pro-
hibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2430A, which itself implements U.S. obligations
10 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 675 (2005)
("Efforts to enforce criminal law, which make legal advice a target of prosecution and an
indicator of guilt, are a sure sign of overcriminalization.").
" 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).
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under the Convention Against Torture. 12 A person may then be held liable
for aiding and abetting any federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 2430A. Second,
international law also directly criminalizes torture. The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, for instance, permits prosecution for crimes
against humanity and war crimes, both of which have been understood to
include torture. 13 Accomplices to a crime may be held liable for aiding, ab-
etting or assisting in a crime "[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commis-
sion of such a crime .... In my view, neither U.S. law nor the ICC Sta-
tute would permit criminal punishment of the Bush lawyers as accomplices
in committing torture. At the very least, the case for criminal punishment
under these laws is so extremely weak that initiating a prosecution of the
Bush lawyers would be little more than political theater without any hope of
actual success.
In order to attribute liability for aiding and abetting a crime under
federal law, the government "must establish that the "'defendant associated
with the criminal venture, participated in it as something he wished to bring
about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed."",15 An aider and abet-
tor is liable for criminal acts that are the "natural or probable consequence
of the crime" that he counseled, commanded, or otherwise encouraged. 16
Similarly, under the ICC Statute, accomplices can be held liable if they aid
for the "purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime .... "" The
federal law criminalizing torture punishes the infliction of "severe physical
,,18
or mental pain ....
Therefore, in order to be held liable for aiding and abetting the tor-
ture under federal law, the Bush lawyers must have intended, through their
legal advice, to purposefully bring about "severe physical or mental pain" as
defined in the statute. Moreover, it is likely that the individuals would have
to be found to specifically intend to inflict severe physical or mental pain
for some illicit purpose in order to be liable under the federal anti-torture
statute.
12 Id. See also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
13 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, available at httpJ/ www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter ICC Statute].
14 Id. art. 25(3)(c).
15 United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112
(1989) (quoting Unisted States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422,425 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir. 1977))).
16 United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1012 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005
(1988) (quoting Russell v. United States, 222 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir.1955)). See also United
States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 45 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
17 ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 25(3)(c).
18 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006).
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As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held, 19
criminal liability for torture requires proof of the intent to inflict severe and
mental pain for some illicit purpose. Infliction of severe physical or mental
pain, and even knowing such pain would be inflicted, such as by housing
individuals in dangerous prisons, would not be torture unless the intent by
putting someone in the dangerous prison was to inflict severe mental or
physical pain for some illicit purpose. Similarly, an individual could not be
held liable as an accomplice unless they had knowledge and the purpose of
assisting in the infliction of severe physical or mental pain for an illicit
purpose.
Under these standards, I respectfully suggest that it is nearly incon-
ceivable that a court in the U.S., or the ICC, could successfully prosecute
any of the attorneys in the Bush administration for their legal advice. It is
therefore not surprising to me that the Obama Justice Department has not
even bothered to open a criminal inquiry into the Bush attorneys, preferring
to leave it to state bar ethics reviews. 20 There has never been any evidence
that the memos were given without good faith or without a sincere belief
that their advice was correct. In this factual context, it is hard to imagine
how the necessary intent for criminal liability could be proven.
In other words, under the view of the Bush lawyers, none of the
techniques they approved qualified as "severe physical or mental pain"
within the meaning of the anti-torture statute. In their now-famous formula-
tion, the torture statute does not criminalize an act of severe pain unless the
pain is significant enough to cause permanent physical damage or organ
failure. 2' As subsequent memos demonstrated, the Bush attorneys faithfully
hewed to this formulation by approving certain techniques (e.g., water-
boarding) only after concluding that these techniques did not violate this
standard. They also ruled out certain procedures as violating these stan-
dards, by for instance, limiting the number of times an individual could be
waterboarded and requiring pads to be used behind an individual's neck so
that any pushing would not cause injury, and requiring an insect used to
frighten a detainee be clearly identified as non-deadly. 22
19 Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2008).
20 See, e.g., Terry Frieden, Early Report Doesn't Recommend Charges for Torture Memos,
CNN, May. 5, 2009, httpl/www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/05/torture.memos/index.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
21 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 46 (Aug. 1, 2002), 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 615
(2006).
22 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to
John A. Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of al
Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002).
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This is not to say that the memos' legal analysis was correct. Ra-
ther, the point is that as long as the attorneys believed such advice was cor-
rect, they could not have the intent necessary to violate the torture statute.
Similarly, the Bush attorneys would also lack the necessary "knowledge"
that they were aiding and abetting a criminal act since they genuinely be-
lieved that there was no criminal act being committed. Without such intent,
in my view, there is absolutely no chance of criminal liability.
Thus, critics of the Bush attorneys' advice must establish more than
that their advice was wrong or even unethical. They must establish that it
was unreasonable and that it was not given in good faith. This seems to be
an impossible standard to meet in this case. In attacking the advice, critics
have focused on three main arguments.
First, they have argued that the Bush attorneys' analysis of specific
intent was incorrect and unduly narrow. Whatever one thinks of this argu-
ment, the idea that there is no specific intent requirement for the Torture
Convention cannot be said to be unreasonable, especially in light of a recent
Third Circuit en banc opinion adopting a similar theory.23
Second, critics have argued that the Commander in Chief argument
is unduly broad and gives the President the right to override congressional
statutes. While there are some valid criticisms of this argument, it is again
hard to maintain that this argument is, in general terms, unreasonable. After
all, the argument has a long pedigree and was most recently embraced by
Walter Dellinger, President Clinton's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) chief
in arguing that Congress could not restrict U.S. military cooperation with
the U.N. or by President Obama himself, when he issued signing statements
declaring that he would treat certain federal statutes as non-binding since
they would otherwise interfere with his constitutional powers.24
Third, the most controversial and difficult part of the legal opinions
is their definition of severe physical or mental pain. It is here that most of
the critics have concentrated their fire. But given the complete lack of U.S.
precedent interpreting this phrase and the uncertainty over the U.S. govern-
ment's willingness to fully incorporate international definitions of "severe"
pain, I cannot say that the standard drawn by the Bush lawyers is objective-
ly unreasonable. At the very least, it is clear that the standard is not a sham
standard without any actual practical limits. As later legal opinions released
by President Obama demonstrated, the standard was applied in almost ex-
23 Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008).
24 See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Honorable
Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, Re: Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute
Unconstitutional Statutes (Nov. 2, 1994), available at httpJ/www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.
htm. See also President Barack Obama, Statement Upon Signing HR 2346 on June 24, 2009
(June 26, 2009), available at httpJ/www.whitehouse.gov/the_pressoffice/Statement-from-
the-President-upon-signing-HR-2346/.
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cruciating detail to limit the scope and nature of the interrogation tech-
niques. For instance, a detainee who feared stinging insects could be threat-
ened with such an insect so long as the insect was actually harmless.25 One
may still think the techniques that were authorized constitute severe pain
and therefore "torture" but such a disagreement does not necessarily make
the Bush lawyer opinions unreasonable.
I should, at this point, mention the only major international law
precedent where attorneys where arguably punished for the content of their
legal advice. In the famous Justice Case arising out of the prosecution
of Nazi officials after World War II, one of the international tribunals
convicted a number of high-ranking judges and legal advisors to the Nazi
regime.26
Although superficially analogous, it is hard to see those WWII cas-
es as providing adequate precedent for the prosecution of the Bush lawyers
here. The judges convicted in the Justice Case had been part of the regime
for a number of years and had participated in the formulation of legal re-
forms in the judicial system that resulted in discriminatory treatment and
greater discretion for the Nazi regime. Such constant and longstanding par-
ticipation, the tribunals found in a number of cases, was enough to establish
the necessary motive and intent for criminal liability.
The most important difference is the pattern of longstanding coop-
eration with the Nazi regime rather than one or two legal opinions on a sin-
gle issue of legal policy. Moreover, almost all of the defendants were
judges, rather than executive branch attorneys, and they were chastised for
violating their duties of independence in order to collaborate with the Nazi
regime.27 Their long standing cooperation on a number of issues over a se-
ries of years provides a much stronger evidence of intent. In any event, the
cases did not involve any serious attempt to analyze legal opinions on a
particular issue, but a pattern of conduct over a number of years of which
legal advice constituted one part.
There is another legal opinion from that era that seems more ana-
logous to the Bush legal opinions. Former U.S. President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's Attorney General, Robert Jackson (later of Nuremberg fame),
wrote a legal opinion that authorized the lease of destroyers to Great Britain
despite the operation of the Neutrality Act of 1917 that seemed to prohibit
such leases. 28 As Yale Law School Professor Edwin Borchard pointed out at
25 See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency from Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, at 3 (Aug. 1, 2002).
26 See 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 1081-82 (1951).
27 See, e.g., id
28 See generally Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroy-
ers, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484 (1940). See also Edwin Borchard, The Attorney General's Opi-
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the time, the opinion relied at least in part on a serious typographical error
in the Attorney General's version of the Neutrality Act that may have af-
fected the plausibility of the legal advice.29 Borchard, and later Daniel Pa-
trick Moynihan, concluded that Jackson's advice was simply wrong.3 °
Moynihan even hinted that Jackson may have known the advice was
wrong.31 In many ways, Jackson's advice was just as controversial and dif-
ficult as the Bush lawyers' advice. But, rightly, this advice has never been
thought to constitute a crime even though it arguably had the consequence
of breaking U.S. neutrality law and committing the U.S. to a war with Ger-
many even before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
III. THE DANGERS OF EVEN UNFOUNDED CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF THE
BUSH LAWYERS
Even if, as I believe, any serious attempt to prosecute the Bush law-
yers would fail, there are dangerous or at least undesirable consequences to
even threatened criminal prosecutions of good faith legal advice. In a num-
ber of cases, the good faith legal advice of attorneys has been held to consti-
tute speech that is protected by the First Amendment. 32 Attorneys have in-
voked such free speech protections in the context of legal malpractice pro-
ceedings, challenges to ethics determinations, and criminal prosecution.
In a recent case arising in New York, defense attorneys were prose-
cuted for advising their nurse-clients that it would be legal for them to re-
sign their jobs despite the fact that they were health care workers.33 In fact,
there was a substantial dispute as to whether such mass resignations were in
fact legal, but in a subsequent prosecution the New York Appellate Division
held that such advice is protected by the First Amendment even if the advice
was incorrect. 34
More importantly, regardless of whether [the defendant-attorney's] legal
assessment was accurate, it was objectively reasonable. We cannot con-
clude that an attorney who advises a client to take an action that he or she,
in good faith, believes to be legal, loses the protection of the First
Amendment if his or her advice is later determined to be incorrect. Indeed,
it would eviscerate the right to give and receive legal counsel with respect
nion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 690, 690-97 (1940);
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONs 71-72 (1990) (arguing for a return to
the conventions of international behavior set out by Woodrow Wilson and the U.N.).
29 Borchard, supra note 28, at 693-94.
30 Id. See also MOYNIHAN, supra note 28, at 71-72.
31 See generally MOYNIHAN, supra note 28, at 71.
32 See, e.g., Vinluan v. Doyle, 60 A.D.3d 237, 250-51, 873 N.Y.S.2d 72, 82-83 (A.D.2d
2009).
33 Vinluan, 60 A.D.3d at 239.
34 Id.
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to potential criminal liability if an attorney could be charged with conspir-
acy and solicitation whenever a District Attorney disagreed with that
advice. 
3 5
Although the First Amendment argument has been invoked in a
number of cases, there has been little analysis of the quality or reasonable-
ness of the legal advice necessary to win First Amendment protection. In
this case, the court required reasonable good faith legal advice and assumed
the existence of such conditions for the purposes of the opinion. 36 As a prac-
tical matter, this makes sense since it is hard to see how attorneys could
have an unrestricted First Amendment right to give legal advice. But the
value and purposes of the First Amendment are obviously enhanced by
shielding reasonable legal advice given in good faith. As I argued above,
there is no evidence of such a lack of good faith regarding the Bush
attorneys' legal advice.
There is one other consequence of the campaign to criminalize good
faith legal advice: a chilling effect on attempts to analyze the law prohibit-
ing torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment, and other interroga-
tion techniques. Frankly speaking, any government lawyer who offers ad-
vice allowing any sort of coercive interrogation is likely to be branded a
criminal, threatened with disbarment, and sued vigorously and repeatedly in
civil actions. Thus, although the initial controversial advice provided by Jay
Bybee and John Yoo was withdrawn and replaced by an entirely new set of
attorneys, both the old and new attorneys alike have been accused of crimi-
nal activity for reaching their controversial conclusions. It is no wonder that
the Obama Justice Department has not, as far as I know, issued legal advice
on the meaning of the Torture Statute or Torture Convention.
The result, of course, is that the government now operates in the as-
sumption that any sort of deviation from the Army Field Manual is ipso
facto torture. This seems implausible, as a legal matter. And even if the pol-
icy to stick with the Manual were a good one, it is a bad sign that lawyers
are too afraid to even to consider alternatives. Such fears should not be li-
mited to advice on interrogations. There are many issues over which sub-
stantial legal controversy exists, and which current government lawyers
recommend at their peril. For instance, the U.S. is currently engaged in the
use of Predator drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other areas of the
world. The legality of such strikes is uncertain under international law, es-
pecially outside of states where tacit consent has been given. 37
" 1d, at 251.
36 See id
37 See, e.g., Michelle Nichols, U.N. Envoy Slams US. for Unanswered Drone Questions,
REuTERs, Oct. 27, 2009, httpJ/in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-43478820091028
(last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
458 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 42:449
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, I believe that there is no chance, based on the current facts,
that any of the Bush attorneys could be subject to criminal liability for their
good faith reasonable legal advice. The good faith nature of the advice
makes it nearly impossible to establish the necessary intent for direct or
accomplice liability. This appears to be true under either U.S. or interna-
tional criminal law standards since both require either purposeful assistance
or knowledge that their acts would assist in the commission of a crime.
But there is something larger at stake here. Government lawyers are
called upon, sometimes, to give difficult and potentially controversial legal
advice under situations of high stress and with enormous stakes. Prosecuting
(or demanding prosecution of) government lawyers who have provided
good faith legal advice can only make this difficult task nearly impossible.
